INTRODUCTION
Defence Intelligence in the UK: an agenda for inquiry within and beyond the '3 mile limit' Philip 
H. J. Davies , Myron Varouhakis and Neveen Abdalla
When reflecting on UK defence intelligence, one is reminded of a mahogany bookshelf with a single book on it. At first glance, it may appear that there is not much to the story, but when you pull the book, the entire bookshelf slides to reveal a labyrinth of history that spans decades in breadth and a surprising depth of other, sometimes additional and sometimes subordinate but no less significant and even less scrutinized, additional organizations, entities, and processes that have made up defence intelligence as both an institution and a function. As a function, it appears lower case as 'defence intelligence' , but as an agency and principal member of the UK Intelligence Community it historically appeared as the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), today unhelpfully rebranded in capitals merely as Defence Intelligence (DI). Neither defence intelligence nor Defence Intelligence has yet experienced the levels of public or academic (or, as we shall see, official and political) interest or concern that has propelled the enthusiastic scrutiny of the national agencies and Cabinet Office central intelligence machinery. And yet DI has generated an undercurrent of influence across the intelligence machinery informing UK policy in a broad range of departmental and national security spheres. Defence intelligence has existed in some form in a succession of organizational incarnations, evolving through many iterations, changing structures, and responsibilities, at least since the end of the Second World War (and even earlier, considering the original pre-war JIC as primarily a defence intelligence entity and DI's lineal precursor).
1 It has played a significant role within today's intelligence community in the UK, yet remains dimly lit compared with the more 'glamorous' national intelligence agencies that have managed to be both more supposedly secretive and yet more visible.
This Special Issue seeks to deepen and strengthen the foundations of understanding the evolution of defence intelligence as both function and institution in the UK in the first instance. But it also seeks to raise the question of defence intelligence more broadly and internationally. The articles herein will examine the evolution of both defence intelligence, and Defence Intelligence, from the early experimental and formative stages within the Ministry of Economic Warfare during the Second World War, through its predecessor the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) in 1946, to the DIS during and after the Cold War, and offer some meditations and speculations on what the future may hold for both function and agency in the British government. As DI's history unfolds, heretofore little remarked names and stories surface along with themes that appear to repeat over the course of decades. First of these is the utility of defence intelligence as the international arena shifted from hot war to Cold War and from Cold War to new world disorder, from classic geopolitical concerns to defence against emerging asymmetric and non-state threats -and in recent years a substantial return to concern about resurgent nation-states whose potential threat had long been deemed well past. One would assume that it is fairly easy to value and prioritize the work of defence intelligence during times of war, but such judgements presumably become harder during peace of the sustained current political no-man's land of low intensity conflicts and peace enforcement operations.
Second amongst the recurring themes is the nature and placement of defence intelligence within the services. Defence intelligence is part of the UK's national intelligence capability, and has provided not only all-source intelligence, but nearly all-topic intelligence, drawn from overt and covert sources, to provide both strategic and operational support to the government. Because of the scale and scope of operations encompassed by defence intelligence, departmental debates have erupted perennially over centralization versus segmentation. Centralization brings the benefits of amassing information and arguably enhancing jointery and multi-agency cooperation, yet it has been met with objections and the ever-present spectre of departmental primacy. This is hardly new or unique to defence intelligence but, because of the need to coordinate, collaborate, and fuse across three fiercely independent armed services as well as civilian intelligence elements, these challenges can be keenly felt and the disputes harder fought than many observers would expect of the supposedly clubbable, collegial British intelligence community.
A third, and surprising, theme to emerge from these papers is the degree to which defence intelligence has been the wellspring of many of the UK's moments of professional reflection on the essential nature of intelligence. Within this we see brief and quickly forgotten flirtations with a British counterpart to the 'theory of intelligence' so well and publicly developed in the US. But where intelligence theory in the US has been an important aspect of the professional account and self-perception of that country's principal national agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, 2 theory-building in Britain has largely been confined to classified correspondence concentrated in and around an agency and function that has struggled to assert itself on the national intelligence stage. And when a formative figure in that British intelligence theory finally did publish openly, it was nearly two decades after he had left intelligence and dealt with systems analysis and decision-making rather than intelligence as such. Finally, the multi-faceted responsibilities of defence intelligence have made it a servant to multiple masters. While the capability rests in the Ministry of Defence, it provides support for both civilian and military operations. In the face of ever shifting requirements and priorities brought forth by both realms, the economy of defence intelligence is an amorphous issue. Questions regarding managing and resourcing defence intelligence operations and the economics of both function and institution have mired defence intelligence, thus impacting governance and capability.
In the first paper of this volume, Philip Davies articulates a range of problems and challenges that afflict defence intelligence either in particular or especially acutely. These are applied chiefly to the UK but with comparative references to experiences in the US to provide a touchstone for considering these problems as more general to defence intelligence rather than peculiar to the workings of Whitehall and Westminster. This discussion offers an insight into the paradoxes which have arisen for DI as the result of a divided mandate and a shrinking budget, and the placement of defence intelligence within the institutional hierarchy. From here, possible directions and trends into the medium term future are considered for both the agency and the function.
Peter Davies then introduces Geoffrey Vickers, a 'forgotten man of British intelligence' (whose role in that little seen British 'theory of intelligence' was referenced above). Vickers was a transformative figure who, as Intelligence Director General for the Ministry of Economic Warfare during the Second World War, turned economic intelligence into an integral and decisive function of Enemy Branch. His holistic approach would later influence the development of the JIB and the evolution of DIS and DI. future shape of British intelligence after the Second World War. Vickers was perhaps first and foremost among these largely forgotten theorists.
Huw Dylan details a history of the JIB as the forerunner to the DIS in this Special Issue. He introduces Vickers' contemporaries and fellow architects (and sometimes disputants) of that unpublished and now largely forgotten British theory of intelligence, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck and Denis Capel-Dunn. Dylan illuminates their disagreements with Vickers regarding the operational structure for peace time intelligence capabilities and the maintenance of a centralized intelligence system. Dylan also introduces Kenneth Strong, the first and only director of the JIB, and the principles Strong set forth in establishing the foundations for what would eventually become the DIS. After the Mountbatten reforms, Strong would even continue for some years as DIS's first Director General of Intelligence.
With Pete Davies and Huw Dylan examining the origins of DI, James Thomson then provides an innovative application of microeconomic theory to the development and operation of DI, examining the conflicts that arise with the unique institutional costs of defence intelligence, focusing on amorphous 'property rights' of defence intelligence among its consumers. Thompson demonstrates that the paradox that arises when the strength of defence intelligence -its ability to provide military and civilian and defence intelligence -is also its weakness, particularly as it pertains to the differing behavioural and environmental expectations: rigidity and structure from the military side, and adaptability and flexibility from the civilian.
This volume concludes with Nick Hare and Peter Coghill's meditation on the changing role of intelligence analysis in the future. Hare and Coghill envision the introduction of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). This type of technology could redefine the mode of work for the intelligence analyst, greatly impacting the skills needed for the task and significantly altering the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers.
The reader should make no mistake, however, about the state of development of this line of inquiry. Intelligence scholarship is at the point of little more than a first pass or two at the question of defence intelligence in the UK, and this represents barely a scratch on the surface of the far larger question of the role and status of defence intelligence institutions globally and comparatively. Even in the British case, the unexplored territory remains daunting in its scale. Huw Dylan may have provided us with an excellent account of DI's precursor the JIB, 4 but this work is focused strictly on the metropolitan JIB in London. Much as the UK's permanent deployed post-war commands in Singapore, Cyprus, and West Germany had their own Joint Intelligence Committees (of which only JIC(FE) has received any significant attention), so there were (at least) a JIB(FE) in Singapore and a JIB(ME) in Cyprus, neither of which has received any historical scrutiny. The same might be said of other joint service intelligence components such as the Joint Air Reconnaissance Centre (JARIC; today reconstituted and relocated as the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre). Work on JARIC by one of this issue's editors (Davies) has examined the central JARIC (UK) and its relationship with the Whitehall intelligence machine, 5 but apart from Roger Arditti's examination of the role of Air Intelligence during the Malayan First Emergency 6 and Malcolm Postgate's account of the overall air campaign during the Emergency, 7 very little attention has been given to British JARIC's Far East branch, and none at all to the Cyprus-based JARIC (Near East). These are but two aspects of joint and defence intelligence apparatus that evolved after the Second World War. As will become apparent, there are many other substantial entities and activities under the DI umbrella that await thorough academic scrutiny. And while there have been a range of efforts to apply political theory and concepts to understanding the national intelligence agencies and Cabinet Office 4 Huw dylan, Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945 -1964 Press 2014). intelligence apparatus and the national agencies, 8 there has been no equivalent effort to extend the established study of UK defence policy processes specifically to Service Branch and defence intelligence.
The wildernesses of US defence intelligence are even more daunting where the (also minimally examined) Defence Intelligence Agency is but one player in a much larger and more complex Department of Defense intelligence community. And that community includes not only DIA, three putatively 'national' intelligence agencies and the intelligence agencies of the armed forces and United States Marine Corps, but also the standing joint intelligence arrangements of the various unified and specified commands deployed across the world. Russian military and defence intelligence alone are of a comparable scale and complexity to those the USA but of little interest to a community of observers all but obsessed with the chekisty legacies of the KGB and so-called siloviki who supposedly have secured a stranglehold on the Russian government as a whole. There has been little appetite to investigate the French Direction du Reseignement Militaire with the same vigour as the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extéreiure, at least in English. And Chinese intelligence as a whole, let alone its sizeable military and defence intelligence apparatus, remains more a riddle wrapped in an enigma for today's observers that Stalin's Russia ever managed to be in Winston Churchill's day.
Achieving a robust and comprehensive understanding of defence intelligence functions, institutions, and their ramifications globally represents less a window of opportunity for a few specialists than a work plan for a generation of scholars. This collection of essays offers more a suggestion of possible directions than even a preliminary scouting of the territory. Defence intelligence in every sense represents a realm that is long overdue for exploration and charting.
